Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Crossover QueriesDwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy's Others$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Edith Wyschogrod

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780823226061

Published to Fordham Scholarship Online: March 2011

DOI: 10.5422/fso/9780823226061.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM FORDHAM SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.fordham.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Fordham University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in FSO for personal use.date: 04 August 2021

The Moral Self

The Moral Self

Levinas and Hermann Cohen

(p.405) 26 The Moral Self
Crossover Queries

Edith Wyschogrod

Fordham University Press

Emmanuel Levinas is familiar with the theory of the moral self in neo-Kantianism, particularly in the work of Hermann Cohen, and with Martin Heidegger's criticism of its deficiencies. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that Levinas is in significant conversation with Cohen's thinking, that his own construing of the human person reflects a correction of Cohen's view in accordance with lessons learned from Heidegger's phenomenological approach, and that he puts forward a Cohen-like view in order to overcome the deficiencies of Heidegger's account. The chapter confines its remarks to what is pertinent in Cohen's thought to Levinas's account of the self. For this reason, it proposes to emphasize the last work of Cohen, for only after Cohen had completed his “existential turn” could his work enter into dialogue with what is germane to that of Levinas: Cohen's conception of the human person as a unique individual, an “I”.

Keywords:   Emmanuel Levinas, moral self, neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, Martin Heidegger

Fordham Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .