Chapter two turns to the thinker that Foucault, at the end of his life, rather surprisingly claimed had always been for him the “philosophe essentiel,” i.e., Heidegger. It is shown how Heidegger’s early teaching is prepared to accord a much greater importance to rhetoric than does Foucault. Identifying the problem of the pseudos as more important to Heidegger’s thinking in this domain than has previously been realized, the more especially as it affects the question of the doxa (opinion, view, the central concept of any philosophical account of rhetoric), it is argued, across a wide range of works and courses from the 1920s to the early 1930s (the moment of Heidegger’s explicit espousal of Nazism) that Heidegger, somewhat against his declared intentions, is driven to push the problem of the pseudos further and further back into the question of being itself in such a way that it introduces an undecidability into the truth that is more corrosive than the mere “concealment” that is co-originary with the concept of aletheia, and that this commits Heidegger to the view that truth is always a matter for decision.
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