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TwoThe Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought$
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Roberto Esposito

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780823267613

Published to Fordham Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.5422/fordham/9780823267613.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM FORDHAM SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.fordham.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Fordham University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in FSO for personal use.date: 21 September 2019

The Dispositif of the Person

The Dispositif of the Person

Chapter:
(p.83) 2 The Dispositif of the Person
Source:
Two
Author(s):

Roberto Esposito

, Zakiya Hanafi
Publisher:
Fordham University Press
DOI:10.5422/fordham/9780823267613.003.0005

The term and the concept of person arose out of the intersection between Christian doctrine and Roman law. In the dogma of Christ’s double nature, part divine and part human, the idea of person implies the splitting and superiority of one part over the other. This splitting is also reproduced in the human being, between body and soul. In Roman law, too, the legal category of personhood contains two different conditions, like that of the freeman and the slave, who is reduced to the status of a thing. This exclusion of one part of the human race from the rights of personhood is reproduced in the modern conception of the subject. The chapter analyzes this separating, exclusionary dispositif in the philosophy of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel interpreting them, throughout their differences, in relation to the same machine of political theology.

Keywords:   Christianity, man, person, Roman law, subject

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